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Gender, Productivity, and the Marital Wage Premium

Explanations for married men's wage premium often emphasize greater market productivity due to a gendered division of household labor, though this "specialization thesis" has been insufficiently interrogated. Using data from Wave 2 of the National Survey of Families and Households (N = 972), this paper examines the relationship between wages and time spent in paid labor and housework for married women and men with high levels of labor force attachment and their spouses. Scrutiny of couples' time use finds strong evidence for the gendered division of labor, but little support for the anticipated wage effects of the specialization thesis itself. Less strict sample restrictions point to the need for continued research directed at couples' joint employment and household labor decisions.

A substantial body of research has shown that marriage is strongly correlated with higher earnings for men (for reviews, see Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996). The robust predictive power of marriage found for men's wages has led to an almost ubiquitous inclusion of a control for marriage in wage equations for men. Research into the phenomenon has found that the hourly wages of married men are generally 10% to 40% more than those earned by never-

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married men. Moreover, this finding has remained relatively consistent for decades, despite controls for a myriad of theoretically relevant human capital and job characteristics (Cohen, 2002; Chun & Lee, 2001; Gray & Vanderhart, 2000), even among men employed within the same occupation (Hotchkiss & Moore, 1999) and same-gender identical twins (Antonovics & Town, 2004). One intriguing explanation on offer is that marriage permits men to be more productive in paid labor by allowing them to focus on market production while their wives specialize in home production (the "specialization hypothesis"). Typically, the requisite information on spousal time constraints has not been available to researchers. Moreover, the generalizability of the phenomenon to women has gone largely untested until recently. This paper advances our understanding of the relationship between gender, productivity, and wages by examining the evidence for the specialization thesis for both married women and men.

The specialization explanation for the marriage wage premium emphasizes the well-known neoclassical economic arguments of Becker (1981) and others that a gendered division of household labor benefits male productivity at paid labor, though the precise beneficial mechanism remains unclear. In this literature, productivity is typically inferred from men's wages; uncommonly, Bellas (1992) found that male faculty with homemaking spouses not only had higher salaries than men whose wives were employed but also published significantly more scholarly articles and books. Although nearly all research uses the presence of children as a proxy for household responsibilities, many

studies historically have operated in a social "vacuum" and have inferred specialization from marriage. More recently, some researchers have begun including measures of wives' time allocations. For example, Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) found evidence that wives' hours spent in paid labor had a negative effect on a husband's annual salary, though the authors ultimately concluded that marital matching pairs men who have positive labor-market characteristics with women who have lower levels of labor force attachment. Conversely, both Loh (1996) and Gray (1997) found no relationship between wives' labor market decisions and their husband's marriage wage premium.

More recently, a few studies have directly examined the relationship between wives' household labor and men's wages (e.g. Hersch & Stratton, 1997), but less is known about men's time constraints outside paid employment. Nevertheless, that men perform similar amounts of housework regardless of marital status (Hersch & Stratton, 2000; South & Spitze, 1994; for opposing arguments see Fuwa, 2005; Gupta, 1999) implies that men's household labor is unrelated to the male marriage premium. Indeed, one of the few marital wage premium studies to include measures of the time that men spend on housework and childcare found no significant effect of either on wages (Hersch, 1991). As a result, the extent to which men's household labor, as well as that of their wives, is related to male productivity at paid labor remains provisional.

The little that is known about spousal contributions to productivity and the marital wage premium has been learned primarily from the wives of married men. Nevertheless, there is good theoretical and empirical cause to expect important differences between employed men and women in the relationship between spouses and wages, particularly if children are involved, either because employers perceive mothers as less committed to paid labor than nonmothers (Correll, Bernard, & Paik, 2007), a demand-side explanation, or because women with children curtail their labor supply, which lowers their experience and tenure (Korenman & Neumark, 1992), a supply-side account. It may be that women with children allocate their time in paid labor on the basis of whether a spouse will be able to provide financial support (Budig & England, 2001), though, Hersch (1991) finds that women's wages and children are positively related after controlling for housework and human capital characteristics. That is, women's household labor may function largely through the presence of children. If generalizable, this finding would clarify much about the tentative positive relationship between women's household labor and male productivity. Indeed, exclusive of caring for children, the relationship between hours of women's household labor to male productivity seems more tenuous without further specification. Consequently, supply-side specialization explanations for the marital wage premium remain an important avenue of investigation for researchers.

In addition to considering women and men separately, research on the marital wage premium establishes that a number of human and social capital variables are important predictors of wages. These variables include age and its square, which controls for the parabolic returns of income to age, education, race, occupation, and wealth. Models conducted with a conventional "potential experience" variable (age minus education minus 6) do not provide as good a fit as models that use age, particularly for women, probably because the variable does not accurately capture experience due to time spent out of the workforce and its correlation with education (Hill, 1979).

METHOD

Data

To test the specialization thesis, this paper draws on data from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), a national multistage probability sample originally consisting of 13,007 households, including an oversample of some racial groups and family types including cohabiting couples and recently married persons. The survey was initiated in 1987–1988 and repeated in 1992–1994 and 2001–2003 (see Sweet and Bumpass, 1996, for a detailed description). This data set is especially well suited for an analysis of the specialization hypothesis because of its size and the inclusion of detailed information about earnings, household composition, and household members' time allocations.

Because of financial constraints, NSFH researchers did not interview respondents from previous waves if they were younger than 45 and did not have an eligible focal child at Wave 3. As a result, after applying strict restrictions on inclusion detailed below to Wave 3, the ensuing

sample size was too small for analysis. These same restrictions precluded a time-series analysis of Waves 1 and 2 because the age, marital status, and employment characteristics of so many respondents changed during the 5-year period that too few respondents met the inclusion restrictions in both Wave 1 and Wave 2. Consequently, the analyses presented here are cross-sectional, using data from Wave 2 of the NSFH ($n = 10,005$).

In this literature, it is conventional to restrict analysis to married persons (with spouse present) (57.4% of Wave 2, $n = 5,746$) who reported income (greater than $1) ($n = 3,745$) and were between the ages of 25 and 62, inclusive ($n = 3,606$). For the purposes of testing the specialization thesis, the sample is restricted further to persons who met specific theoretical standards for inclusion. In order to provide a conservative estimate of household specialization benefits of a spouse, only workers who are employed full-time (35 hours or more per week, 46 or more weeks per year) were included ($n = 2,563$). Full-time workers should have the highest levels of labor force commitment and would benefit most from spousal labor. In addition, restricting the analysis to full-time workers reduces the need to include other measures of workforce commitment occasionally used in this literature (e.g., Hill, 1979). Although the emphasis of this paper is to test a supply-side mechanism of the marriage wage premium, it is reasonable to limit the possibility of demand-side mechanisms. Specifically, although research on the marital wage premium typically includes all employed persons and includes controls for the number of hours and weeks usually worked, empirical research indicates that full- or part-time employment status itself is an important marker of wages beyond the logical implication of time in paid employment. In fact, the wage-setting process may differ by employment status, in that part-time employment may serve as a sign of lower workforce commitment to employers (Budig & England, 2001). In short, wage setting for part-time employees may be a substantially different process from that for full-time employees, rather than a simple process of recalculating a salaried wage in light of fewer hours worked (Simpson, 1986; Toutkoushian & Bellas, 2003). For this reason, the sample was limited to persons who are employed in only one job ($n = 2,157$) by someone else (not self-employed or in a family business) ($n = 972$). Following Acock (2005), missing values on independent measures were imputed on the basis of demographic and socioeconomic predictors, using the impute command in STATA (see StataCorp, 2003, for more information). For imputed measures, there was a low rate of missing values (between 0.1% and 2.6%). More conservative listwise deletion techniques resulted in similar findings as those presented in the next section (not shown for brevity).

The subjects of this analysis are the 972 full-time employed men and women who fit the standards for high labor force attachment. Though necessarily married to be included in the analysis, these respondents are not married *to each other*. For the sake of clarity, then, this paper considers the selected NSFH-2 respondents who met the standards for inclusion central to the analysis and refers to them as "respondents," "men," and "women." The paper only uses the terms "spouses," "husbands," and "wives" to refer to the spouses of the selected NSFH-2 respondents. Therefore, when discussing gender differences in contributions to paid labor and housework, the phrase "men and their wives" refers to the analysis of 496 full-time employed men, whereas "women and their husbands" indicates the 476 full-time employed women.

Measures

Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the respondent's personal income received from wages during the past 12 months. The common practice of equalizing hourly and salaried workers by converting the wages of salaried workers to an hourly wage (by dividing annual income by the number of weeks worked in the previous year and the number of hours usually worked per week) masks the long-term productivity of hourly workers; therefore, this analysis relies on the value of respondents' annual wage and salary income.

Key independent variables. A measure of housework is constructed from a nine-part self-enumerated question that asks how many hours per week respondents and their spouses individually spend on specific aspects of household labor: meal preparation; washing dishes and meal cleanup; cleaning the house; outdoor and household maintenance tasks; grocery shopping; washing, ironing, and mending clothing; bill paying; auto maintenance and repair; and

transportation of household members. For four respondents and 4 spouses, the sum time reported spent on household tasks was greater than the total number of hours available in a week and therefore truncated to 168 (see Hersch and Stratton, 2000, for estimates that measurement error in housework time is not a significant problem for analyses using this data set).

Controls. Education is a series of dummy variables for six categories of a respondent's highest degree completed: less than a high school diploma, the omitted category, high school diploma, associate's degree, bachelor's degree, master's degree, and Ph.D. or professional degree. Race is represented by dummy variables for Black; Mexican American, Chicano, Mexicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban; American Indian, Asian or another race; and non-Hispanic White, the omitted category). Occupation is represented by dummy variables for professional or managerial and service occupations as they correspond to the three-digit codes of the 1990 Census and an omitted category that includes sales, clerical, laborer, operative, and farm work employment. Two measures of wealth represent the couple's economic position and stability: savings, a categorical variable, measures the total value of the couple's savings, including IRAs and savings bonds, through a series of nine mutually exclusive but unbalanced ranges spanning no savings at all to more than $100,000; home ownership is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a respondent or spouse owns the current residence and 0 otherwise.

Household context. As mentioned above, the wage premium literature would benefit from integrating personal income into the broader context of the household's economy and activities. Therefore, in addition to the two measures of wealth, the analysis controls for the number of persons in the household; total spousal income, including wages, salary, pensions, and other sources; the number of hours a spouse worked at all jobs; and a dummy variable for spousal disability equal to 1 if spouses are disabled or otherwise need specific care and 0 otherwise.

Analysis

The analysis employs ordinary least-squares regression using weights constructed by the NSFH-2 researchers that take into account the differential probability of selection depending on the whether the case is in the main or racial oversample, the differential probability of selection depending on the number of adults in the household, differential response rates, as well as poststratification to replicate the distribution of the population by age, race, and gender in the Current Population Survey. Most correlations are below .20; the strongest correlations exist between personal income and savings (.49), personal income and education (.50), professional or manager occupation and education (.54), savings and education (.41), and spouses' hours worked and spousal income (.39).

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables separately for men and women. Although hours and weeks worked are not included in the multivariate models, they are included here for illustrative purposes. By gender, these respondents are similar in many respects, including age, education, race, rates of home ownership, savings, number of weeks worked, and household size. Despite the strict sample restrictions to workers with high labor force attachment, the two groups differ substantially in several key respects relevant to the analysis. In this sample, women earn nearly $12,000 less than men, work fewer hours per year, and spend about 13 more hours per week in housework. Only 19% of women have children younger than 5 at home compared to 35% of men. Men spend 44% less time in housework than their wives do (almost 16 fewer hours per week), but women spend 63% *more* time in housework than their husbands (about 12.75 hours more per week), despite the fact that women spend nearly the same amount of time in paid labor as their spouses. Indeed, women put nearly four-fifths as much time into housework as they do in paid labor each week, whereas men's household labor is only about two-fifths of their time spent in paid labor time. Viewed another way, despite high levels of labor force attachment, the women selected for this sample put in nearly the same amount of time in housework as the wives of men in this sample (32.95 hours versus 35.74 hours, respectively); men with high labor force attachment spend 19.86 hours in housework, virtually indistinguishable from the 20.22 hours performed by husbands in this sample. Despite these differences, the pooled income of

Table 1. *Descriptive Statistics for Men (N = 496) and Women (N = 476) With High Labor Force Attachment*

Variables	Men				Women			
	M	*SD*	Range	α	*M*	*SD*	Range	α
Personal income ($1,000s)	35.77	21.92	1 – 160		23.90	17.43	0 – 144	
Age	38.18	8.37	25 – 62		37.88	8.20	25 – 60	
High school diploma[a]	.53	.50	0 – 1		.60	.49	0 – 1	
Associate's degree[b]	.06	.23	0 – 1		.08	.27	0 – 1	
Bachelor's degree[c]	.21	.41	0 – 1		.17	.38	0 – 1	
Master's degree[d]	.08	.27	0 – 1		.07	.25	0 – 1	
Ph.D. or professional degree[e]	.05	.21	0 – 1		.01	.11	0 – 1	
Black[f]	.07	.26	0 – 1		.12	.33	0 – 1	
Mexican or other Hispanic[g]	.06	.23	0 – 1		.06	.24	0 – 1	
Other race[h]	.03	.16	0 – 1		.01	.10	0 – 1	
Professional or manager[i]	.32	.47	0 – 1		.35	.48	0 – 1	
Services[j]	.08	.27	0 – 1		.10	.30	0 – 1	
Household size	3.59	1.35	2 – 9		3.53	1.26	2 – 8	
Savings[k]	3.32	2.49	0 – 8		3.11	2.54	0 – 8	
Owns home[l]	.73	.44	0 – 1		.75	.44	0 – 1	
R: Housework (weekly hours)	19.86	14.61	0 – 107	.84	32.95	21.94	0 – 168	.83
Spouse's income ($1,000s)	14.99	15.63	0 – 121		29.39	21.41	0 – 130	
Spouse disabled[m]	.15	.35	0 – 1		.22	.42	0 – 1	
Spouse: Hours worked (weekly)	35.02	11.17	0 – 90		45.03	11.76	0 – 94	
Spouse: Housework (weekly hours)	35.74	22.97	0 – 168	.84	20.22	19.17	0 – 168	.83
Young children (<5 years)[n]	.35	.48	0 – 1		.19	.40	0 – 1	
R: Hours usually worked	47.54	9.92	35 – 94		42.01	6.53	35 – 85	
R: Weeks worked (last 12 months)	51.79	.94	46 – 52		51.90	.64	46 – 52	

[a]High school diploma: 0 = *not highest degree received*, 1 = *highest degree received*. [b]Associate's degree: 0 = *not highest degree received*, 1 = *highest degree received*. [c]Bachelor's degree: 0 = *not highest degree received*, 1 = *highest degree received*. [d]Master's degree: 0 = *not highest degree received*, 1 = *highest degree received*. [e]Ph.D. or professional degree: 0 = *not highest degree received*, 1 = *highest degree received*. [f]Black: 0 = *not Black*, 1 = *Black*. [g]Mexican or other Hispanic: 0 = *not Mexican American, Chicano, Mexicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban*, 1 = *Mexican American, Chicano, Mexicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban Black*. [h]Other race: 0 = *not American Indian, Asian, or another race*, 1 = *American Indian, Asian, or another race*. [i]Professional or manager: 0 = *not employed as a professional or manager*, 1 = *employed as a professional or manager*. [j]Services: 0 = *not employed in services*, 1 = *employed in services*. [k]Savings: 0 = *none*, 8 = *$100,000 or more*. [l]Owns home: 0 = *owns primary residence*, 1 = *does not own primary residence*. [m]Spouse disabled: 0 = *not disabled*, 1 = *disabled*. [n]Young children: 0 = *no children in household less than 5 years old*, 1 = *children in household less than 5 years old*.

couples is comparable. Men earn more than twice their wives' incomes from all sources; as a couple, their earnings are approximately $51,000 per year. Although women in the sample earn less than their husbands on average (about $5,500), when pooled, the couple's annual income is a little more than $53,000.

Separate multivariate regression models for men and women's annual wage incomes are presented in Table 2. The relationship between the personal annual wages of men and women, respondents' own housework, and their spouses' household labor is the focus of the analysis. These models demonstrate no significant relationship between spouses' time in housework or paid labor and annual earnings for men or women, although the coefficients are positive, as expected. Moreover, men's own household labor is unrelated to their earnings in paid labor. Women's housework time approaches significance. Interestingly, the direction of the coefficient for spouses' hours spent at paid labor is opposite for men and women, though not significant.

The conservative estimate of the specialization hypothesis in Table 2 is based solely upon men and women with the highest level of workforce commitment because these workers are theoretically the most likely recipients of wage

Table 2. *Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Analyses for Variables Predicting Men's (N = 497) and Women's (N = 476) Wages, High Labor Force Attachment Only*

Variable	Men			Women		
	B	*SE B*	*β*	*B*	*SE B*	*β*
Age	1.81	0.86	.73*	0.75	0.75	.37
Age squared	−0.02	0.01	−.67*	−0.01	0.01	−.33
High school diploma	2.61	1.85	.06	1.62	1.86	.04
Associate's degree	−0.48	3.24	−.005	2.33	2.98	.03
Bachelor's degree	9.52	2.91	.18***	7.89	3.17	.17*
Master's degree	15.46	5.13	.20**	6.93	5.08	.09
Ph.D./professional degree	26.28	8.58	.23**	48.58	23.35	.28*
Black	−2.62	2.70	−.03	1.21	1.96	.02
Mexican or other Hispanic	−2.17	2.77	−.03	−2.15	1.54	−.03
Other race	−6.01	4.09	−.04	3.03	5.16	.02
Professional/managers	7.29	2.48	.15**	6.76	2.23	.18**
Services	−1.73	4.75	−.02	−1.68	1.67	−.02
Household size	−0.50	0.84	−.03	−0.65	0.63	−.04
Savings	3.00	0.53	.33***	2.31	0.50	.32***
Owns home	2.02	2.29	.04	0.34	1.36	.01
R: Housework	−0.05	0.07	−.04	−0.07	0.04	−.07
Spouse's income	0.02	0.08	.01	0.01	0.07	.01
Spouse disabled	−0.15	2.39	−.002	−2.59	1.91	−.06
Spouse: Hours worked	−0.15	0.10	−.07	0.09	0.08	.06
Spouse: Housework	0.01	0.04	.01	0.03	0.03	.02
Has young children	1.95	2.46	.04	2.91	2.12	.06
R^2		0.42			0.41	
F for change in R^2		11.45			10.02	

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

advantages resulting from spousal household labor. Does a gendered division of household labor have any bearing on the wages of workers with varying levels of labor force attachment? To examine this possibility, I expanded the analysis in Table 2 to include all married employed persons aged 25 to 62, inclusive, who reported wage income, without restrictions on the number of hours and weeks worked, number of jobs held, or type of employer (self, family, or unrelated other). This analysis, presented in Table 3, provides important information on the relationship between employment status, wages, and productivity as most of the marital wage premium literature examines it. Unlike the analysis of workers with high labor force attachment in Table 2, Table 3 includes controls for hours and weeks spent in paid labor. For men ($N = 1,693$), wives' time spent in housework and paid labor remains unimportant to men's wages, although men's own household labor marks significantly lower wages (each weekly

hour of men's housework is associated with $94 lower annual personal wages, or $1.81 per week). For women ($N = 1,831$), conversely, husbands' household labor is associated with significantly higher wages. Each hour per week that husbands spend in housework predicts $56 higher annual earnings ($1.08 per week) for women. But the beta coefficients indicate that the negative effect of women's own time spent in housework is not offset by husbands' housework; each weekly hour of women's household labor marks a reduction in yearly earnings of $63 ($1.21 per week). Finally, for women, but not men, the presence of young children predicts significantly higher annual earnings. All else equal, women with young children earn $2,658 more annually than women without children and women whose children are older than 4 years of age. Except for the negative effects of men's housework, the findings generally hold when respondents with high labor force commitment are excluded (not

Table 3. *Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Analyses for Variables Predicting Men's (N = 1,693) and Women's (N = 1,831) Wages for All Levels of Labor Force Attachment*

Variable	Men			Women		
	B	*SE B*	*β*	*B*	*SE B*	*β*
Age	1.60	0.60	.54**	0.50	0.35	.28
Age squared	−0.02	0.01	−.46*	−0.005	0.004	−.23
High school diploma	3.11	1.24	.05*	3.12	1.00	.09**
Associate's degree	1.27	1.91	.01	4.94	1.88	.08**
Bachelor's degree	9.99	2.26	.15***	7.54	1.44	.17***
Master's degree	21.39	4.49	.21***	10.77	2.18	.17***
Ph.D./professional degree	35.21	8.27	.25***	28.43	7.44	.22***
Black	−2.03	1.43	−.02	2.95	1.08	.05**
Mexican or other Hispanic	−0.96	1.61	−.01	−0.04	0.95	−.001
Other race	−2.61	3.64	−.01	5.71	3.13	.05
Professional/managers	4.74	1.70	.08**	5.17	1.12	.14***
Services	−1.43	1.94	−.01	−2.20	0.83	−.04**
Household size	0.03	0.46	.002	−0.31	0.30	−.02
Savings	2.34	0.29	.21***	1.50	0.20	.22***
Owns home	3.95	1.29	.05**	0.19	1.04	.004
R: Hours usually worked	0.20	0.05	.10***	0.29	0.03	.24***
R: Weeks worked	0.54	0.05	.13***	0.27	0.04	.17***
R: Housework	−0.09	0.05	−.05*	−0.06	0.02	−.08***
Spouse's income	0.01	0.05	.01	−0.01	0.02	−.02
Spouse disabled	−2.48	1.35	−.04	−0.42	0.84	−.01
Spouse: Hours worked	−0.07	0.06	−.03	0.01	0.03	.01
Spouse: Housework	0.04	0.03	.03	0.06	0.02	.05**
Has young children	3.45	2.30	.05	2.66	1.08	.06*
R^2		.33			.41	
F for change in R^2		27.56			27.08	

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

shown for brevity; table available from author upon request).

DISCUSSION

A prominent supply-side theoretical explanation of the male marriage wage premium links increased productivity at paid labor and men's wages through the domestic contributions of wives. In the context of this account, this paper examined two related questions: Is a gendered division of household labor related to the wages of married men? If so, do the earnings of employed married women benefit in the same way as men?

The specialization explanation for the marriage wage premium predicts that workers with the highest level of labor force attachment should benefit most from the household labor contributions of a spouse. Despite the fact that a strong division of labor even for these workers is apparent from the descriptive statistics, a conservative analysis applied to married, full-time year-round workers provides no support for the thesis that a gendered division of labor has a significant relationship to wages for either men or women. Consequently, at least for full-time workers, the marriage wage premium identified in so much other research is not explained by the gendered division of household labor. This is also consistent with other researchers' findings that men's household labor is irrelevant to wages (Hersch, 1991; Hersch & Stratton, 2000). That the coefficient for spouses' hours spent at paid labor is opposite for men and women is also consistent with a degree of marital matching (Jacobsen & Rayack, 1996). This finding suggests that men with high labor force attachment pair with wives with lower levels of attachment, whereas women with high labor force attachment pair with husbands of similar inclination.

In demand-side explanations for the marriage wage premium, labor force attachment can play a large role. Employers may use an applicant's quest for full-time employment as a proxy for employee commitment and view part-time-employment seekers as having lower labor force attachment and therefore award no wage premium to married part-time employees. Additionally, for persons employed in multiple part-time positions, the wage-setting process may differ between various jobs. Indeed, because working overtime or in part-time employment in multiple positions may inflate annual wages to approximate full-time wages, the common technique in this literature of calculating hourly wages from annual wages should not be relied on as an accurate measure of the agreed-on wage from an employer. Moreover, it may be that married workers who work two part-time jobs that are the equivalent of full-time labor (e.g., two jobs at 20 hours each per week) may be more motivated or productive than married workers who are employed full-time by only one employer. As a result, it may be that research on the marital wage premium that includes part-time workers is, in fact, modeling multiple, distinct processes of wage setting by employers or wage acceptance by employees. Consequently, part-time workers pose an important theoretical distinction in the relationship between marriage, productivity, and wages.

On the basis of these demand-side insights, when attention is directed instead at workers with varying levels of labor force attachment, the analysis finds that the proposed household specialization mechanism exists primarily for women. There is a strong association between women's wages and the household labor of their husbands, but there is no corresponding evidence that wives' time constraints are related to men's wages. On the whole, these findings suggest that pooling all workers, as most studies do, may improperly estimate returns to wages for women, but not men, and that part-time work is not only differently associated with wages independent of the nominal distinction but also misdirects estimates of spousal benefit to the marriage wage premium. Thus, analysis of full-time workers seems to indeed be a more conservative approach to explicating the contributions of specialization to the marriage wage premium. Future research on the wage premium will benefit from disaggregating employment categories beyond controlling for weekly hours worked.

The analyses herein contributed in three ways to our understanding of the labor specialization explanation for the marriage wage premium phenomenon—by extending the analysis to employed married women, by measuring annual wages rather than hourly wages, which masks long-term productivity, and by analyzing *both* spouses' time use and constraints. The findings demonstrate that these constraints benefit from independent theoretical and empirical exploration and yield important suggestions about variability in the relationship of household time and wages and the patterns that may guide household time use decisions. Although couples clearly subscribe to the gendered division of labor, even workers with the highest labor force attachment, couples with lower attachment may make household task decisions in part on the basis of both their own time and earnings and on the time and earnings of the other spouse. The results of this study suggest that continued attention be directed to examining marital matching practices and couples' joint employment decision-making processes within the context of the household economic situation (e.g., Raley, Mattingly, & Bianchi 2006).

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